Is Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Convincing?
Aristotelian virtue ethics is convincing. The clashing virtues objection reveals a limitation rather than a fatal flaw. The clear guidance objection fails because ethics cannot be reduced to rules and practical wisdom is itself a form of guidance. The Swanton objection is answered: virtues are necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia, and the quality of a virtuous life is itself a component of flourishing.
- Aristotelian virtue ethics holds that the ultimate end of human life is eudaimonia — flourishing — which is not merely a feeling of happiness but an objective condition of living well, achieved through performing the characteristic human function of rational activity well over a complete lifetime - The function argument grounds this claim: just as a knife’s function is to cut and a good knife cuts well, the human function is rational activity, and a good human performs this activity well. Virtues are the character traits or dispositions that enable us to perform our rational function well — courage, temperance, justice, and practical wisdom among them. They are not rules to be followed but stable habitual dispositions developed through practice and education, standing as means between the corresponding vices of excess and deficiency - Central to the theory is phronesis — practical wisdom — the intellectual virtue that enables us to identify what virtue requires in particular circumstances. Since ethical situations are too complex and diverse for general rules to cover, phronesis provides the judgement needed to perceive the morally relevant features of a situation and act accordingly - A strength of the theory is that it captures the importance of character and motivation in moral life, and its emphasis on human flourishing as the basis of ethics has been enormously influential, particularly through Foot’s naturalistic revival and Anscombe’s critique of legalistic moral theories - I will consider three objections: that AVE cannot resolve dilemmas involving competing virtues, that it fails to give sufficiently clear guidance on how to act, and that not all virtues contribute to eudaimonia. I will argue that Aristotle can respond to each and that AVE is therefore convincing
Section 1: Clashing Virtues
- The Aristotelian response has genuine force. If virtues are understood as dispositions rather than absolute rules, many apparent conflicts dissolve under careful reflection. The mother’s case, on inspection, may well have a virtuous resolution that honours both love and lawfulness properly understood - However the response is not fully convincing in all cases. Some situations involve genuine moral tragedy where no resolution fully honours all relevant virtues — climate policy, for instance, may require genuine trade-offs between justice to present and future generations where practical wisdom cannot fully reconcile the competing demands. The Aristotelian claim that all conflicts are merely apparent seems too optimistic - Nevertheless this does not defeat the theory. Acknowledging that some situations are genuinely difficult and that virtue requires judgement rather than rule-following is not a weakness but an honest recognition of moral complexity. The objection identifies a limitation of the theory rather than a fatal flaw
: The Clashing Virtues Objection
- Aristotle’s ethics requires cultivating all the virtues and acting as a virtuous person would act. But virtues can clash, leaving the theory unable to guide action. Consider a mother whose child has committed a murder: being loving towards her child and being lawful are both virtues, yet she cannot act on both simultaneously. If she turns him in, she acts lawfully but unlovingly; if she protects him, she acts lovingly but unlawfully. Aristotle’s theory provides no general principle for resolving such conflicts — and without one, the theory fails to tell us what to do in precisely the cases where guidance is most needed
Aristotle: The Aristotelian Response — Phronesis Resolves Conflicts
- The Aristotelian will agree that there is no general strategy applicable to all cases of conflicting virtues. But this is not a fault in the theory. Different situations involving different conflicting virtues must be thought about on a case-by-case basis. The virtuous person, exercising phronesis, will attend to all the morally salient facts of the situation and arrive at a virtuous resolution. For Aristotle, any apparent conflict between virtues is resolvable rather than genuinely irresolvable — practical wisdom reveals what virtue actually requires in the particular circumstances - In the mother’s case, practical wisdom might reveal that turning her son in is itself the genuinely loving thing to do — that protecting him from accountability would harm both him and others, and that real love is not indulgence. On this view, there is no genuine clash: the virtues converge once the situation is properly understood - Furthermore, virtues are not rules to be applied absolutely. The virtue of honesty does not command telling the truth in every conceivable circumstance regardless of context. It commands being an honest person — having the disposition to be truthful — and practical wisdom distinguishes cases where honesty is called for from cases where other considerations rightly take precedence
Section 2: Lack of Clear Guidance
- The objection has genuine force — there is something frustrating about being told to do what a practically wise person would do when one lacks that wisdom. The circularity concern is real and Aristotle does not fully resolve it - However the Aristotelian response is ultimately convincing. The objection assumes that ethics must take the form of a rule-governed decision procedure, but this assumption can itself be challenged. Aristotle is right that ethical situations are too complex and diverse for any general rule to cover adequately, and that the best preparation for moral action is the cultivation of character rather than the memorisation of principles - The point about competing theories is important. Utilitarianism does not in practice provide clearer guidance than AVE — the difficulty of predicting consequences and calculating utility means that in complex real situations, a person of practical wisdom is at least as well equipped as a utilitarian calculator, and arguably better. The objection’s force depends on a contrast with other theories that does not hold up on examination
: The Lack of Clear Guidance Objection
- This objection is more serious than the clashing virtues problem because it applies not merely to conflict cases but to all moral decision-making. The claim is that AVE provides no practically useful guidance whatsoever. Kant’s categorical imperative and the utilitarian principle of maximising happiness are normative rules that can be applied to specific situations. Aristotle offers only: be virtuous, do as a virtuous person would do, exercise practical wisdom. But this is circular and unhelpful — when you are in a situation requiring moral guidance, being told to do what a practically wise person would do gives you no assistance if you do not already know what virtue requires. The doctrine of the mean is the closest Aristotle comes to an ethical formula, but it will not generate specific guidance in particular situations - This is a more crucial objection than Section 1 because it targets not situations where virtues conflict but the entire enterprise of using AVE as a normative ethical theory. It suggests that AVE simply cannot do what a normative ethical theory is supposed to do
Aristotle / Anscombe: The Aristotelian Response — Ethics is a Skill, Not an Algorithm
- The Aristotelian can make two points. First, it is wrong to claim AVE offers no guidance — the virtues themselves guide the thinking of a virtuous person about how to be good. What AVE denies is that there is guidance in the form of a rule or rules covering all situations. Second, AVE is not a normative ethical theory in the same sense as utilitarianism or Kantian ethics. If normative theories must offer universal rules like the utility principle or categorical imperative, then AVE is not that kind of theory — and Aristotle never claimed it was. As Anscombe argues, AVE focuses primarily on the person and their character rather than on individual actions. Making ethical decisions is more like a skill or expertise requiring judgement tailored to relevant circumstances than the application of an algorithm - Furthermore, by the time we ask what the right thing to do is, most of us already have some understanding of the good life from moral education and practical experience. This understanding, developed through habituation, is itself a form of guidance — not a rule, but a cultivated capacity for moral perception - The objection also assumes that competing theories do better. But this is questionable. Utilitarian theories require predicting consequences, which is practically very difficult. Bentham’s hedonic calculus may seem to offer precise guidance but cannot deliver it in practice. A person who has cultivated the virtues and possesses practical wisdom may actually be better placed to act rightly in complex situations than one following a utility calculation
Section 3: Virtue Does Not Always Contribute to Eudaimonia
- The function argument lies at the heart of AVE and the Swanton case does pose a genuine challenge to it. If the connection between virtue and flourishing can be severed by bad luck, it is not clear why virtue is the reliable path to the good life that Aristotle claims - However the Aristotelian response succeeds. The criticism assumes that virtues are sufficient for eudaimonia — that virtue alone guarantees flourishing. But Aristotle never claimed this. The virtues are necessary conditions for eudaimonia, not sufficient ones. Once this distinction is drawn, the Swanton case is not a counterexample to the function argument but an illustration of what happens when virtue is present but luck is absent. The function argument remains intact - The further point about the woman’s life is also well taken. Eudaimonia is not merely a matter of what happens to a person but of how they live — their character, their engagement with their rational function, the meaning they find in virtuous activity. A short but deeply virtuous life spent in service to others is not straightforwardly a failure of flourishing, even if it is not the best life available
Swanton: Swanton’s Objection — Virtue Does Not Guarantee Eudaimonia
- This is the most fundamental challenge to AVE because it targets the function argument — the central pillar of the theory. The function argument holds that virtues are what enable humans to perform their rational function well and thereby achieve eudaimonia. If virtue and eudaimonia can come apart, the function argument collapses and the entire justification for cultivating the virtues is undermined - Christine Swanton develops a case to show they can come apart. Imagine a woman who provides medical support in a poor and isolated community with high rates of infectious disease. She works tirelessly, demonstrating kindness, compassion, generosity, and justice. She is paradigmatically virtuous. Sadly, at twenty-three she contracts the disease herself, suffers greatly for six months, and dies. Despite her virtue, hers was not a flourishing human life — she did not live long enough, and there was great suffering at its end - If a person can be fully virtuous yet fail to achieve eudaimonia, then virtue is not reliably the path to the good life. This suggests we need a different account of what makes virtue valuable — perhaps one grounded in the general social good rather than individual flourishing
Aristotle: The Aristotelian Response — Necessary but Not Sufficient
- The Aristotelian can reply that the objection misunderstands the relationship between virtue and eudaimonia. The virtues are necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia — while you cannot be eudaimon without being virtuous, you can be virtuous without being eudaimon. Aristotle always acknowledged that the good life requires some good fortune as well as virtue. The woman in Swanton’s example was virtuous but unlucky — she suffered greatly and her life was cut short. This does not show that virtue and eudaimonia come apart in any theoretically damaging way; it shows that extreme misfortune can prevent virtue from achieving its aim - Furthermore, we might question whether the woman’s life was simply bad. She suffered greatly at the end, but her life may have been deeply fulfilling through the great courage and compassion she demonstrated, especially if she undertook her work voluntarily and with full awareness of the risks. Hers was not the best life, but nor was it the worst — and the quality of her character and the meaning she found in her work are themselves components of flourishing that survive even her tragic end
- The clashing virtues objection is partially but not fully answered: practical wisdom can resolve many apparent conflicts, but some cases may involve genuine moral tragedy. This reveals a limitation rather than a fatal flaw - The clear guidance objection fails: Aristotle is right that ethics cannot be reduced to rules, and the cultivation of practical wisdom is at least as effective a guide to moral action as any algorithmic alternative. Competing theories do not in practice provide the clearer guidance the objection assumes - The Swanton objection is answered: virtues are necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia, and extreme misfortune is not a counterexample to the function argument but an illustration of virtue being prevented from achieving its aim. The quality of a virtuous life is itself a component of flourishing - Aristotelian virtue ethics is therefore convincing